

~~TOP SECRET~~
Security Information

Official Diary
Acting DD/I

Wednesday, 19 November 1952

1. At morning meeting, took up the following points:

What to pass to State and the FBI of material received from [REDACTED] 25X1X6
D/CI stated that he had informed Papish of the FBI of the existence of this
effort of ours and therefore that it was all right to pass material to the
FBI. Suggested that same be done through [REDACTED] He finally forbade the
passing of anything to State that contained derogatory information about Ameri-
can citizens. Of course, material involving [REDACTED] had already gone
to State. Later discussed this matter with [REDACTED] and turned it
over to them for execution. Also, warned [REDACTED] to abide by the instructions
set forth above.

Albanian estimate - Board of Estimates concurred in desirability of
estimate on possible overthrow of Commie Government in Albania requested by
Generals Balmer and Weckerling. I recommended that the D/CI propose such an
estimate to the IAC on Thursday. He concurred.

[REDACTED] - I told him that I had been advised by AD/SI that
General Craigie A-3 will probably address a letter to him asking further CIA
support for this project on exploitation of capabilities now in the research
stage. O/RR and O/SI have already collaborated extensively, e. g., in pre-
paring elaborate target map. Same forwarded to D/CI for information.

Re briefing Eisenhower - Told O/CI we were considering and were pre-
pared to recommend creation of the secure center at the [REDACTED] 25X1A6a
with a secure teletype link to O/CI. Although somewhat dubious at first, he
agreed that this would be feasible and directed that immediate study be made
of its feasibility. This is being done by Sheldon and Security. He also
agreed that [REDACTED] would be an excellent man to station in New York as
Liaison Man with Eisenhower after his return [REDACTED] 25X1A6a

2. Attended PRC meeting.

3. Lunched with John Allison, Ass't. Sec'y FE of State, and other
deputies. Principal item of intelligence gleaned from the discussion was
that Chiang Kai Shek is now less interested in returning to the mainland or
any other specific venture than he was in the mark he would make upon history.
Therefore, everything directed to him should bear this in mind. He also felt
that Burma was swinging slowly but surely in our direction and that our ef-
forts should be stepped up in that country.

DDP
was
also
there
so
didn't pass
anything.
non

~~TOP SECRET~~
Security Information

Official Diary
Acting DD/I

Wednesday, 19 November 1952

4. Conferred with Kent and Sheldon re co-operation in the production of estimates. Basis for the discussion was the recent memorandum from AD/CI to AD/NE and DD/I upon the inadequacies of 21/1. I got away from this and pitched the discussion as much as possible on memorandum from Kent to [REDACTED] dated 1 February 1942, and found Sheldon completely unaware of this concept of his responsibilities. I stated that for the next six weeks I would expect CI to participate at all essential stages in the estimating process wherein they had matters of substance to contribute to the end that the final product would represent the best intelligence available in CIA as well as elsewhere. I also stated that if CI felt that its views were not accepted on any critical point it was duty-bound to furnish me with a memorandum so I could advise D/CI as to the split in view. It was agreed that the forthcoming Albanian estimate would be used as a test to perfect necessary working arrangements to achieve foregoing objectives.

25X1A9a

5. Attended Career Service Board and approved the compromise directive to the Career Selection Panel on the explicit understanding that Security, Medical, etc., would co-operate in discussing with the Board doubtful cases.

6. Discussed with Sherman Kent the question of a replacement for Dr. Sontag upon his departure next summer. He spoke highly of Professor [REDACTED] I urged that he consider strongly [REDACTED] because of his general competence and particularly his ability as an effective presiding officer plus his knowledge of the needs of the primary consumers of our estimates.

25X1A9a
25X1A5a1
25X1A5a1

7. During the course of the day there were many changes in the plans for the briefing of General Eisenhower. Latest, as of 1825 hours, is that D/CI will go up weekly on Friday afternoons, with ADD/I prepared to stand by in his place but that there will be no more daily courier runs.

8. [REDACTED] came in to report his attempt to brief Eisenhower. It seems that one Colonel Greene had never got to the President-elect so [REDACTED] was unable to accomplish the mission. The net result is that Greene called D/CI and arrangement mentioned hereinbefore was then set up.

25X1A9a
25X1A9a

[REDACTED] 25X1A9a